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Abstract
We study empirically how competition among high-frequency traders (HFTs) affects their
trading behavior and market quality. Our analysis exploits a unique dataset, which allows
us to compare environments with and without high-frequency competition, and contains an
exogenous event - a tick size reform - which we use to disentangle the effects of the rising share
of high-frequency trading in the market from the effects of high-frequency competition. We
find that when HFTs compete, their speculative trading increases. As a result, market liquidity
deteriorates and short-term volatility rises. Our findings hold for a variety of market quality
and high-frequency trading behavior measures.
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1 Introduction
High-frequency traders (HFTs) are market participants that are characterized by the high speed
with which they react to incoming news, the low inventory on their books, and the large number
of trades they execute (SEC (2010)). The high-frequency trading industry grew rapidly since its
inception in the mid-2000s and today high-frequency trading represents about 50% of trading
in US equity markets (down from a 2009 peak, when it topped 60%; see report of the TABB
Group, 2017). A distinguishing feature of the high-frequency industry is fierce competition (see,
e.g., Wall Street Journal, 2017). While existing empirical research focuses on the general effects
of high-frequency trading on market liquidity, price discovery and volatility, the question of how
competition among HFTs affects market quality and market dynamics is largely unaddressed.
Recent theoretical models predict that competition among HFTs can harm market liquidity.
In Budish et al. (2015) and Menkveld and Zoican (2017) HFTs engage in two types of trading
strategies: market-making and speculative. High-frequency market-making provides liquidity
and is useful to investors. High-frequency speculative trading entails “sniping”stale quotes of
high-frequency market makers, and is detrimental to investors because it increases the cost of
liquidity provision. In Budish et al. (2015), any change from a non-competitive high-frequency
trading environment to an environment with two or more HFTs harms market liquidity since
high-frequency speculative trading increases and liquidity providers incorporate the cost of getting
sniped into the bid-ask spread they charge. In Menkveld and Zoican (2017), the higher the number
of HFTs in the market, the higher bid-ask spreads.
In this paper, we test these theories and study empirically how competition affects HFTs’ trading
behavior and market quality. Such tests face several challenges: First, capturing high-frequency
trading competition requires having a record of high-frequency trading in all trading venues in
which HFTs may trade a particular security. Second, the theories predict that an environment with
one HFT (no high-frequency trading competition) generates very different outcomes compared
to an environment with two or more HFTs (high-frequency trading competition), necessitating a
dataset in which both environments can be observed. Third, data typically confounds two distinct
phenomena: more high-frequency trading in the market and the effects of high-frequency trading
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competition. Previous empirical literature focused on the first phenomenon and found that more
high-frequency trading is beneficial for market liquidity (see in particular Hendershott, Jones, and
Menkveld (2011) or Menkveld (2013)). Given that theoretical models of high-frequency trading
competition suggest that its effects go in the opposite direction, analyzing high-frequency trading
competition empirically requires separating the effects of high-frequency trading competition from
the effects of rising high-frequency trading. Separating the two effects is also key for deriving
policy implications: it may be that regulators should encourage high-frequency trading but not
competition among HFTs.
To deal with these challenges, we exploit a unique dataset that captures the trading of
internationally well-established large HFTs on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (SSE), the largest
Nordic exchange. Our sample consists of NASDAQ/OMXS30 Index stocks and runs from June 2009
through January 2010. The data enable us to track the activity of each individual high-frequency
trading firm as we observe unmasked user and trading firm identities of HFTs.1 Crucially for our
analysis of competition, during this period, essentially all trading of listed securities took place
on this single exchange. Moreover, we observe environments with one HFT in a stock as well as
environments with HFTs competing in a stock. Lastly, our sample contains an exogenous event -
a tick size change - which we use to disentangle the effects of the rising share of high-frequency
trading in the market from the effects of high-frequency trading competition per se.
We define competition as two or more HFTs trading the security, as in Budish et al. (2015).
We map the trading outcomes of each HFT into two broad trading categories - market-marking
and speculative - using several measures to perform such classification.
To assess the effects of high-frequency trading competition, we employ two main methodologies.
First, we apply a difference-in-differences methodology, in which we use entries and exits of HFTs
in specific equities to compare an environment with no high-frequency trading competition
to an environment with high-frequency trading competition. We analyze the data at the
security-day-trader level and include time and security fixed effects to account for unobserved
heterogeneity across time and securities driven by, e.g., stocks’ volatility, liquidity, or outstanding
volume differences. Our difference-in-differences analysis shows that when HFTs compete,
1Our dataset captures high-frequency trading activity coming from dealers’ proprietary trading desks as well as
from high-frequency trading firms that use direct market access arrangements with registered dealers.
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their speculative trading increases relative to their market-making activity and market quality
deteriorates, as predicted by the theoretical literature. Specifically, we find that competing HFTs
trade on the same side of the market in about 70% of cases when looking at 5-minute intraday
periods. Speculative high-frequency trading increases by about 12 percentage points from about
29% to 41% of all high-frequency trading. As a result of more speculative high-frequency trading,
market liquidity worsens and intraday volatility increases. In particular, bid-ask spreads increase
by 5%, Amihud (2002)’s measures of illiquidity increase by 18%, trade price impact (Kyle’s
lambda) increases by 23%, and order execution shortfall increases by 4 percentage points. Intraday
volatilities increase between 9% and 14%, depending on the length of the intraday interval. By
contrast, interday volatility - whether measured from open to close or from close to close prices -
does not change significantly. This is intuitive as HFTs usually close their positions at the end of
each trading day and should therefore mostly influence intraday measures.
The second methodology we employ is a regression setup of triple differences, which aims at
disentangling the effects of the rising share of high-frequency trading in the market from the effects
of high-frequency trading competition. We exploit an exogenous event, a tick size harmonization
reform by the Federation of European Securities Exchanges (FESE), implemented on October 26th,
2009. The reform decreased tick sizes for most, but not all of the stocks in our sample, effectively
splitting the stocks into 3 groups. Group 1 was not affected by the reform because prices of stocks
in this group happened to fall within a certain range (e.g., SEK 100 to SEK 150, an equivalent
of USD 14.70 to USD 22.05). The other stocks were affected by the reform and experienced a
significant decline in tick sizes. Importantly, the relative tick size - the tick size relative to the
stock price - declined for some stocks to lower levels than for other stocks. We conjecture that the
lower the relative tick size the more likely HFT entry as HFTs weigh benefits and costs of entry
and relative tick size is reflective of likely trading costs. To test this conjecture empirically, we
use the pre-reform minimum relative tick size to split the affected stock into those whose relative
tick sizes are above the pre-reform minimum (Group 2) and those whose relative tick sizes are
below the pre-reform minimum (Group 3). Concretely, the minimum relative tick size prior to the
reform was about 6 basis points. After the reform, stocks in Group 2 continue to have relative tick
sizes above 6 basis points, while stocks in Group 3 have lower relative tick sizes of between 3 and
3
6 basis points.
We document that Group 1 - unaffected by the tick size change - did not experience any change
in high-frequency trading activity. This is one control group. In Groups 2 and 3 - affected by
the tick size change - high-frequency trading activity increased.2 Crucially, we document that
while Group 3 experienced HFT entry, there was no change in high-frequency trading competition
in Group 2. This is intuitive as HFTs deciding to trade based on relative tick sizes would have
already traded stocks with Group 2-like relative tick sizes as they were available in the market
prior to the reform.
The tick size reform therefore induces time-series variation in the intensity of high-frequency
trading activity whereas relative tick size differences provide cross-sectional variation in high-frequency
trading competition, allowing to disentangle the two effects. With regard to the effects of more
high-frequency trading per se, we find that market quality is either unaffected or improves. With
regard to the effects of high-frequency competition, we find that HFTs use more speculative
trading strategies and, as a result, liquidity deteriorates and short-term volatility rises. The results
from the triple differences thus confirm that the channel through which high-frequency trading
competition adversely affects market quality is through an increase in speculative trading.
We conduct several robustness checks. We show that pre-event stock characteristics do not
determine entry, by comparing the pre-competition behavior of a propensity-score-matched sample
of the stocks that face competition in the upcoming periods against a propensity-score-matched
sample of firms that do not face competition. Furthermore, we report our findings separately for
HFT entries and exits, and show that exits have an opposite effect to entries, of similar magnitude.
Also, we consider an alternative measure of high-frequency trading competition by exploiting a
continuous measure of competition, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Lastly, we provide evidence
from an alternative model, a simple panel regression with extensive controls.
Our results have important implications for both regulators and trading venues. The U.S.
2Frino et al. (2015), Hagstromer and Norden (2013) or Meling and Odegaard (2017) also document that
high-frequency trading activity increases following a decline in a relative tick size. Note that these papers, like ours,
investigate both market-making and speculative high-frequency trading. A related strand of literature focuses on
market-making HFTs and documents that liquidity-providing HFTs benefit in an environment with larger relative
tick sizes (O’Hara et al. (2015)). Yao and Ye (2014) focus on price versus time priority and argue that relatively
large tick sizes constrain non-HFTs from providing better prices and allow HFTs to establish time priority over
non-HFTs.
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Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) states that high-frequency trading should only be
allowed if it benefits long-term investors. Moreover, SEC rules aim at increasing competition among
liquidity suppliers. Modern liquidity suppliers are predominantly HFTs. However, our results
highlight that competition among HFTs leads to a deterioration of market quality, which originates
from an increase in speculative high-frequency trades. Markets should therefore be designed in a
way that promotes high-frequency trading but eliminates competition among speculative HFTs.
The paper contributes to the growing empirical literature on high-frequency trading.3 Two
papers most closely related to ours are Boehmer et al. (2018) and Brogaard and Garriott (2018).
Boehmer et al. (2018) use a principal component analysis to determine the correlation between
high-frequency trading strategies.4 They argue that similarity in high-frequency trading strategies
is a proxy for the intensity of competition between high-frequency trading firms and conclude
that short-term volatility of a stock declines with higher correlation. Like Boehmer et al. (2018),
our paper emphasizes the analysis of high-frequency trading strategies. The important difference
between their paper and ours is that their analysis of correlations between high-frequency trading
strategies cannot disentangle between the effects of the rising share of high-frequency trading in
the market from the effects of high-frequency trading competition. This is what our analysis of
triple differences allows us to do, and we conclude that more high-frequency trading competition
harms market quality.
Brogaard and Garriott (2018) also study high-frequency trading competition and find that
high-frequency trading competition improves market quality, a result opposite to ours. An
earlier version of this paper precedes Brogaard and Garriott (2018) so we view our paper
as contemporaneous. Their paper uses data from the newly established Canadian trading
platform Alpha. That dataset has several disadvantages for the analysis of high-frequency trading
competition. First, Brogaard and Garriott (2018) do not observe trading identities; instead they
assume that trading firms are HFTs if they fulfill certain account characteristics. This makes the
number of HFTs in the market - a crucial ingredient to study high-frequency trading competition
3Among the theoretical contributions are those of Ait-Sahalia and Saglam (2017), Biais et al. (2015), Bongaerts
and Achter (2016), Cespa and Vives (2019), Foucault et al. (2016), Han et al. (2014), Hoffmann (2014), Jovanovic
and Menkveld (2016), Li (2014), Pagnotta and Philippon (2018), Rosu (2019), and Vayanos and Wang (2012).
4Benos et al. (2017) also examine the extent to which the trading activity of HFTs is correlated and the impact
on price efficiency.
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according to the theoretical literature - an assumption. Second, high-frequency trading activity
in Canadian stocks is split among several trading platforms, with only 7%-18% taking place on
the Alpha platform, which provides only a partial record of high-frequency trading in a particular
stock and does not allow capturing high-frequency trading competition. Third, throughout their
sample period of 2008-2012, Alpha grew rapidly and went through frequent upgrades such as the
installation of quicker servers, which affected high-frequency trading activity and can obfuscate
the specific effects of competition. By contrast, the dataset and the sample period we use are not
affected by these issues. In addition, we exploit an exogenous event to analyze competition-specific
effects.5
By focusing on how a competitive environment influences HFTs’ choice between market-making
and speculative trading strategies, our paper relates to a strand of literature which documents HFTs’
activities and strategies. Hagstromer and Norden (2013) distinguish between market-making HFTs
and opportunistic HFTs, documenting that most high-frequency trading volume is market-making
and that the activity of market-making HFTs mitigates intraday price volatility. Even when HFTs
follow market-making strategies, however, market liquidity can deteriorate because non-HFTs
are crowded out (Yao and Ye (2018)). Foucault et al. (2017) argue that when prices adjust with
a lag to new information, this creates arbitrage opportunities and high-frequency arbitrageurs’
response to these opportunities impairs liquidity by imposing adverse selection risk on market
makers. Other papers analyzing high-frequency trading strategies include, e.g., Baron et al. (2018),
Hagstromer et al. (2014), Hirschey (2018), or van Kervel and Menkveld (2018).
By examining the impact of high-frequency trading competition on market quality, our paper
is related to a strand of the literature which analyzes the effects of high-frequency trading on
markets (e.g., Carrion (2013), Hasbrouck and Saar (2013), Brogaard et al. (2014), Huh (2014),
Jarnecic and Snape (2014), or Kirilenko et al. (2017)). Menkveld (2013) examines the trading
of one HFT entering the market and finds that market conditions improve. Results from our
analysis of triple differences are consistent with this result as we find that more high-frequency
5The Alpha exchange itself did not seem to regard high-frequency trading as fully beneficial as it introduced,
in 2015, speed bumps to reduce high-frequency trading activity, citing that it aims ”to deliver superior execution
quality for natural investors and reduce trading costs” for ”participants who do not use speed-based trading strategies”
(TMX press release, TMX (2015)). A recent paper by Anderson et al. (2018) shows that the speed bumps on Alpha
led to a decline in market share of HFTs and benefitted market quality on the exchange.
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trading in the market, if not accompanied by competition, has positive or neutral effects on market
quality. Our paper is also related to the literature on algorithmic trading, which is a broader
classification than high-frequency trading. Both high-frequency trading and algorithmic trading
use algorithms to trade. While algorithmic trading is used to automate, for example, block trades
to minimize price impact or for hedging, high-frequency trading involves short-term investments
aimed at making profits from buying and (immediately) selling. The literature also investigates
the effects of automation on liquidity, informational efficiency and volatility. Contributions include
Hendershott et al. (2011), Hendershott and Riordan (2013), and Foucault and Menkveld (2008),
and Boehmer et al. (2015).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe our NASDAQ OMX data as
well as our measures of market quality and trading. In Section 3 we present the methodology. In
Section 4 we discuss our findings. We provide several robustness checks in Section 5 and conclude
in Section 6.
2 Data and Measurement
In subsection 2.1, we describe the data we use. In subsection 2.2, we discuss the measurement of
market quality, volatility and high-frequency trading behavior.
2.1 Data Description
The trading data come from NASDAQ OMX Nordic and incorporate information about all trades
executed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (NASDAQ OMX). We focus on the OMXS30 index,
which hosts the thirty biggest public companies in Sweden, because we observe that HFTs trade
in liquid stocks and restrict their trading activity to Sweden’s major securities during our sample
period. For each trade, the dataset contains a rich set of variables. For the purpose of our analysis,
we rely on the following variables in particular: exchange membership names, type of access to the
exchange (four different speed levels), account information, order size, order placement timestamp,
order identity, execution identity, trade size, and trade execution price and trade timestamp.
Timestamps are in milliseconds and ranked within each millisecond.
The sample period is from June 2009 through January 2010. The sample period and the data
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we analyze offer several key advantages for the analysis of competition among HFTs.
First, over our sample period, essentially all continuous trading - which is the one relevant for
the analysis of high-frequency trading activity - was taking place on the NASDAQ OMX and was
not split among other exchanges in Sweden. This means that we have a comprehensive record of
high-frequency trading activity in a particular stock so that we can observe whether or not HFTs
are competing in that stock at each point in time.6
Second, the dataset allows us to track the activity of individual HFTs. Specifically, we observe
unmasked identities for members of the stock exchange, which include all large HFTs. This
allows us to directly identify proprietary trading of those HFTs. For non-proprietary trading,
we combine, for each trade, account information with the information on the type of connection
a trader used to access the exchange to check whether those identities could be assigned to an
HFT. We find that non-proprietary trading in our sample does not display any characteristics
typical for HFTs. In particular, non-proprietary trader identities using the fast connection to the
exchange are characterized by a very low number of trades (often less than 3 per day and security;
compared to an average of around 300 trades per day and security for large HFTs). This implies
that it is the large HFTs - for which we observed unmasked identities - who are responsible for the
high-frequency trading activity in our sample. This finding is not very surprising. For example,
Clark-Joseph (2014) documents that also in the U.S. market, the majority of all high-frequency
trading is accounted for by the trading volume of the eight largest HFTs accounts.7
Third, the Swedish Stock Exchange is an established exchange and the HFTs in our sample are
all experienced international HFTs with significant market shares all around the world.8 Stocks
listed on OMXS30 lie in the range of U.S. medium- and large-cap stocks.9 Our results are therefore
6Appendix A provides more institutional details.
7We also cross-checked the accuracy of the identities information in the trading data, by matching them to identities
used in the proprietary transaction-level data from the Swedish financial supervisory authority (Finansinspektionen),
a Swedish equivalent of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, which collects all transactions with financial
instruments from financial institutions. Our identities from the trading database match the ones from the financial
supervisory authority.
8HFTs in our dataset have similar characteristics: On average, each HFT has an about 10% market share (trades
and volume), executes around 270 trades per day and stock, and holds near-zero inventories at the end of the trading
day.
9Table A-1 gives an overview and key statistics for all thirty stocks traded in the OMXS30 (see, e.g., Brogaard
et al. (2014) for summary statistics on the US stock market). The number of stock trades per day varies between
1247 and 6103 across all stocks. The average relative time-weighted spread in our sample is between 0.09% and
0.24%.
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likely applicable beyond the Swedish market. Indeed, given the high quality of the Swedish data,
there are numerous studies by now that analyze trading in the Swedish equity market. For example,
Hagstromer and Norden (2013) show that HFTs are important players in the Swedish market.
Other empirical studies that use Swedish data include Baron et al. (2018), Brogaard et al. (2015),
Hagstromer et al. (2014), and van Kervel and Menkveld (2018).
Fourth, during our sample period of June 2009 through Januaray 2010, those international
HFTs just entered the Swedish market, bringing with them time-proven trading strategies from the
other markets they operated in. The fact that high-frequency trading in Sweden was in its infancy
means that we can observe changes from the non-competitive environment to the competitive
environment, and vice versa. This allows us to test the predictions of the theoretical models which
suggest that the two environments generate very different outcomes.
We add to the trading database order book information (timestamps, bid and ask prices,
bid-ask spreads) on the OMXS30, obtained from Thomson Reuters Tick History. We first match
the trades from Thomson Reuters Tick History with the corresponding trades in the trading
database, and then complement the trades with the order book information before and after the
trade was executed.
Finally, for daily variables that do not need to be computed from the trading data, we rely on
Bloomberg.
2.2 Measures
In this subsection, we describe the liquidity measures, volatility measures and high-frequency
trading measures we use. All measures are at the stock-day level. Table 1 provides an overview of
each measure.10
2.2.1 Liquidity Measures
We use several liquidity measures in our analysis, relying on existing measures from the literature
and additionally developing new measures, made possible by the granularity of our trading database.
We discard trades and orders that are executed off-book, or during call auctions, or within fifteen
10In the Appendix, we present a correlation matrix of all measures; see Table A-2.
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minutes before or after these auctions.
In terms of existing measures, we compute bid-ask spreads, intraday Amihud (2002) measures
of illiquidity, price impact measures (Kyle’s lambda), and autocorrelation.
Bid-ask spreads. This is a standard measure of illiquidity. For each stock, we use end of
5-minute spreads, and average those over a day.
Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure. The measure is defined as the ratio of absolute stock
return to its volume in units of currency (in this case, Swedish krona or SEK). It is a measure of
price impact as it captures the price response associated with one SEK of trading volume. If the
price changes quite a bit relative to the volume traded, the stock is illiquid; and vice versa. We
compute the illiquidity measures over 5-minute windows, and average them over a day.
Price impact measure (Kyle’s lambda). Similarly to the Amihud (2002) measure, this
measure aims to capture price impact but unlike Amihud (2002) measure, it is regression-based
(see, for example, Stoll (2000)). In particular, daily price impacts are captured by:
rd,t,j = IMPACTd,j ∗NBVd,t,j + d,t,j .
Here, rd,t,j are the 5-minute returns calculated from the log midpoint prices and NBVd,t,j is the
net buy turnover (turnover of active share buys - turnover of active share sells). IMPACTd,j is
the price impact parameter and d,t,j the error term on day d, for each 5-minute interval t and
stock j. To ensure that our daily estimates are comparable, we force all the explanatory power
onto the order flow by constraining the estimated intercept parameter to be zero.
Autocorrelation. While not a measure of liquidity, we use autocorrelation to assess market
efficiency. Intuitively, the more efficient prices are, the closer they are to a random walk. Deviation
from a random walk are indicated by both positive and negative autocorrelation. We measure
daily autocorrelations as the absolute first-order return autocorrelation, using the final mid-quote
of 5-minute intervals.
The granularity of our trading database allows us to measure liquidity in a new, additional,
way.
Order execution shortfall. We compute a measure of marketable orders of non-HFTs that
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cannot be filled completely, a measure of market depth. When a marketable order hits the market,
it is executed against standing limit orders, if there are enough limit orders in the order book. The
less liquid the stock, the lower the number of fully executed marketable orders, and vice versa. We
therefore compute the ratio of the number of non-high-frequency marketable orders that could not
be executed completely to the total number of non-high-frequency marketable orders. We also
compute the same ratio based on turnover, rather than the number of orders.
2.2.2 Volatility Measures
We use several variables to assess both intraday and interday price volatility.
Intraday volatility. We define intraday realized volatility as the sum of squared returns
based on the final mid-quote of 5 minutes, as well as high-low intervals.
Interday volatility. For interday volatility, the intervals are either open mid-price to close
mid-price, or close mid-price from the previous trading day to close mid-price.
2.2.3 High-Frequency Trading Measures
Taking a first look at the trading behavior of HFTs, we find that competing HFTs trade on
the same side of the market in about 70% of cases when looking at 5-minute intraday periods.
In addition, their inventories are significantly positively correlated when competing for trades.
This suggests that HFTs are likely to have correlated trading strategies under competition. Our
high-frequency trading measures below formalize this conjecture.
In the models of high-frequency trading competition by Budish et al. (2015) and Zoican and
Menkveld (2017), high-frequency trading competition harms market liquidity since HFTs increase
their speculative trading. To assess this theoretical prediction, we classify the trades of each HFT
into speculative or market-making, using several measures to do so. Our measures fall into two
categories.
Price pressure measures. The first category of measures is designed to capture whether
a high-frequency trade leans against the price pressure (market-making) or whether it puts a
further pressure on the price (speculative). A high-frequency trade is classified as speculative if the
stock midpoint price moved upwards (downwards) over the 5 minutes preceding a high-frequency
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buy (sell) trade, but the midpoint price move reverses over the 5 minutes following that trade.
Intuitively, the price reversal indicates that the preceding price move was non-fundamental and
therefore suggests that an HFT traded for speculative reasons. We compute the ratio of the
number of such speculative high-frequency trades to the total number of high-frequency trades in
a particular stock over a day. We also compute the same ratio based on turnover, rather than the
number of trades.
Directional trading measures. The second category of measures is designed to capture
directional or momentum high-frequency trading (a form of speculative trading). We consider
three variants of the directional trade measure, as follows. The first variant is given by:
DIRECT1d,j =
1
T
T∑
t=1
rd,t,j
HFTvolbuy,d,t,j −HFTvolsell,d,t,j
turnoverd,t,j
(1)
with HFTvolbuy,d,t,j (HFTvolsell,d,t,j) being high-frequency trading turnover from buy (sell) trades
on day d, over a 5-minute interval t, in stock j. rd,t,j is the stock’s midpoint return over the
5-minute interval and turnoverd,t,j is the total stock turnover within this interval.
This measure becomes positive if HFTs buy with an increasing - or sell with a decreasing -
stock price, and negative when HFTs trade in the opposite direction to the price movement. A
positive DIRECT1 measure indicates directional or momentum trading, while a negative measure
indicates trading against the trend.11
The second variant, DIRECT2, replaces the turnover within 5 minutes in the denominator
above with the daily average 5-minute turnover, 1T
T∑
n=1
turnoverd,n,j . This measure ensures that
changes in the directional trading measure are not driven by changes in the turnover within the 5
minutes.
The third variant, DIRECT3, replaces the actual midpoint return rd,t,j with an indicator
variable, equal to 1 if the return is positive within the 5-minute interval t and equal to −1 when
the return is negative. This measure ensures that changes in the directional trading measure are
not driven by the midpoint return changes. Note that the interpretation does not change: the
measure is positive with directional trading and negative with counter-directional trading.
11We share the aim of capturing directional high-frequency trading with the recent papers by Hirschey (2018) and
van Kervel and Menkveld (2018) who analyze high-frequency trading around large non-high-frequency trades.
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3 Methodology
In subsection 3.1, we discuss our baseline difference-in-differences regression set-up. In subsection
3.2, we discuss the details of the tick size harmonization reform, a plausibly exogenous event,
which we exploit to disentangle the effects of the rising share of high-frequency trading in the
market from the effects of high-frequency trading competition.
3.1 Baseline Model
We use difference-in-differences tests to exploit daily cross-sectional differences among stocks.
Stocks can face repeated competition among HFTs over time, through entries and exits of HFTs.
An entry is a change from no high-frequency trading competition to high-frequency trading
competition, and an exit is the opposite change. We focus our attention on 228 event windows
around changes from no competition to competition, or vice versa.12 In the baseline model, we
use entries and exits jointly (in a robustness check, we also consider entries and exits separately).
The changes from no competition to competition, or vice versa, are the relevant events in the
baseline model. For each event window, we assign stocks to be part of the control group if there is
one HFT active in them (no competition), and to the treatment group if there are two or more
HFTs active in them (competition). This means that we have different control and treatment
groups for each event. The advantage of this approach is that multiple treatment and control
groups reduce the bias and noise that can be associated with a single comparison (see Bertrand
et al. (2004) for details on this approach).
The difference-in-differences test setting is summarized in the following equation:
ye,j,d = α+ β1D
comp
e,j,d +Xe,j,dΓ + pd +mj + ue,j,d, (2)
with e indexing entry or exit, j being the security and d the time (day). Dcompe,j,d is the event dummy
set to 1 if there is high-frequency trading competition in security j at time d, and to zero if there
12We define these event windows from up to three days before to up to three days after the change. The average
length of an event window is 4.3 days. The reason for the differences in length is that there can be a change in
the competition status less than three days before or after. We have experimented with different lengths of event
windows; our results remained consistently unaltered.
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is no high-frequency trading competition. pd are daily time-fixed effects and mj are security-fixed
effects. Xe,j,d is the vector of covariates and ue,j,d is the error term. The dependent variable ye,j,d
takes the form of market quality and trading measures.
The key identifying assumption behind a difference-in-differences analysis is that, with the
exception of the treatment itself, there is no difference between the treated and control groups that
cannot be captured by stock-fixed effects. Put differently, the parallel trend assumption must hold,
implying that there is a similar trend in the endogenous variable during the pre-event period for
both the treatment and the control group. In our analysis, the same stocks serve as treatment and
control stocks within different events. Therefore, differences before an entry or after an exit are
small. Figure 1 illustrates this for Amihud’s illiquidity measure (top panel), for 5-minute volatility
(middle panel), and for high-frequency trading behavior (bottom panel) three days before and
three days after an entry.
In addition, Table 1 provides summary statistics for all illiquidity, volatility and high-frequency
trading measures we use in the analysis, for both the control group and the treatment group. In
the left panel, statistics on the baseline model are reported for the days prior to an HFT entry.
The Table documents that differences between the control and treatment group are small, for all
measures. See Section 5.1 for a more detailed analysis of these differences, which illustrates that
the control group and treatment group pre-treatment are indistinguishable.
3.2 The Tick Size Reform
Our sample period contains an exogenous European-wide event - a tick size reform - which we
use to disentangle the effects of the rising share of high-frequency trading in the market from the
effects of high-frequency trading competition. While more high-frequency trading benefits market
quality, as documented in several empirical studies (e.g., Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld, 2011
or Menkveld (2013)), high-frequency trading competition can harm market quality, according to
the recent theories (Budish et al. (2015) and Menkveld and Zoican (2017)). Disentangling the
two effects is important for deriving policy implications: if we confirm empirically that the effects
of high-frequency competition go in the opposite direction to the effects of rising high-frequency
trading, it follows that regulators may encourage high-frequency trading, but not competition
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among HFTs.
The tick size reform in 2009 was designed by the Federation of European Securities Exchanges
(FESE). The FESE represents 46 exchanges for equities, bonds, derivatives, and commodities. The
reform harmonized tick sizes across all major European stock exchanges. The NASDAQ OMX
Stockholm introduced the new tick sizes (known as FESE Tick Size Table 2) for its OMXS30
shares as of Monday, October 26, 2009.
Figure 2 summarizes the impact of this reform on the tick sizes in the market. The reform
decreased tick sizes for most, but not all, of the stocks in our sample. Whether or not a stock was
affected by the reform depends on its price. As nominal stock prices convey no information about
the fundamental properties of a stock, such as liquidity or volatility, it is exogenous which stocks
were affected by the reform and which were not.13 14 Specifically, stocks with the pre-reform tick
size of SEK 0.25 saw their tick size decline to SEK 0.10 (the dashed beige line in Figure 2). Stocks
with the pre-reform tick size of SEK 0.10 saw their tick size either unchanged (the dash-dotted red
line), or decline to SEK 0.05 (the dotted blue line) or even lower to SEK 0.01 SEK (the dashed
blue line); the ultimate tick size change depended on the stock’s price. Finally, stocks with the
pre-reform tick size of SEK 0.02 saw their tick size decline to 0.01 SEK (the solid blue line).15 16
Given the decline in tick sizes following the reform, the relative tick sizes - the tick sizes relative
to the stock prices - also declined. The relative tick size changes can be a factor affecting HFT
entry as HFTs weigh benefits and costs of entry and relative tick size is reflective of likely trading
costs. Importantly, the relative tick size declined for some stocks to lower levels than for other
stocks, and the reform reduced the overall minimum relative tick size in the market from 6 to 3
basis points. We can therefore divide the stocks in our sample into three groups, depending on
whether or not their relative tick sizes changed, and depending on whether or not the change in
the relative tick size is above or below the pre-reform minimum of 6 basis points.
13Exceptions are penny stocks, a phenomenon that indicates that the company faces bankruptcy. There are no
such stocks in our sample, however.
14Note that in principle a stock could experience a decline in the tick size for two reasons: 1) a stock was affected
by the reform or 2) a stock’s price dropped and fell into a different tick size category. We checked that the second
reason never occurred in our sample.
15Figure A-1 and Figure A-2 in the Online Appendix provide further details of the tick size changes and the
associated bid-ask spreads, for the different tick size tables used on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. Those details
are not of key importance to our methodology and are therefore relegated to the Online Appendix.
16In US dollar terms, SEK 0.25 corresponds to USD 0.0368; SEK 0.10 to USD 0.0147; SEK 0.05 to USD 0.0074;
and SEK 0.01 to USD 0.0015, based on the exchange rate as of the pre-reform trading day of October 23, 2009.
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Figure 3 provides the overview of the stocks in the three groups and their relative tick sizes
(vertical axis) before and after the reform (horizontal axis). The grey-shaded area in the figure
indicates the relative tick size levels that were not available in the market prior to the reform (3 to
6 basis points). Group 1 stocks, represented by the hollow diamonds in Figure 3, are the stocks
whose tick size - and therefore relative tick size - was not affected by the reform at all. For the
affected stocks, we use the pre-reform minimum relative tick size of 6 basis points to split them
into those whose relative tick sizes are above the pre-reform minimum (Group 2, represented by
the hollow circles) and those whose relative tick sizes are below the pre-reform minimum (Group
3, represented by the filled circles).
Crucially, we document that while in Group 2 there was no change in high-frequency trading
competition, Group 3 experienced HFT entry. This is intuitive as HFTs deciding to trade based
on relative tick sizes would have already traded stocks with Group 2-like relative tick sizes as they
were available in the market prior to the reform.
Figure 4 documents how the reform affected high-frequency trading activity across the three
groups. Group 1 stocks - unaffected by the reform - did not experience any change in high-frequency
trading activity (dashed-dotted line). It will thus serve as a control group in our analysis. In
Groups 2 (solid line) and 3 (dashed line), high-frequency trading activity increased immediately
following the reform. In Group 2, high-frequency trading participation about doubled from before
to after the reform, from about 8% to about 16%. In Group 3, high-frequency trading participation
about tripled from before to after the reform, from about 8% to about 24% on average.
The tick size reform therefore induced time-series variation in the intensity of high-frequency
trading activity whereas relative tick size differences provided cross-sectional variation in high-frequency
trading competition. We use an empirical set-up of triple differences to test the effects of
high-frequency trading competition, while separating the effects of increased high-frequency
trading activity. The set-up is summarized in the following equation:
yj,d = α+ β1(Postd ∗Reformj ∗Group 3j) + β2(Postd ∗Reformj)
+pd +mj +Xj,dΓ + uj,d, (3)
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with j indexing the security and d being the time (day). Postd indicates the period after reform and
Reformj indicates whether security j is affected by the tick size reform, i.e. securities belonging to
Group 2 or Group 3. Group 3j is also a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 for securities
belonging to Group 3 and 0 otherwise. Therefore, β1 captures the effect of high-frequency trading
competition over and above the general change due to the tick size reform itself. The latter is
captured by β2. Variables pd are daily time-fixed effects and mj are security-fixed effects. Xj,d is
the vector of covariates and uj,d is the error term. The dependent variable is yj,d and takes the
form of the same market quality and trading measures as in the test setting above.
Table 1, right panel, provides summary statistics for all liquidity, volatility and high-frequency
trading measures we use in the analysis, for Group 1 (unaffected by the reform), and Groups 2
and 3 (affected by the reform but differing in high-frequency trading competition). The table
documents that there is no pattern in the pre-event differences, and that differences, if any, are
small.
4 Empirical Results
In subsection 4.1, we present results of our baseline difference-in-differences estimations. In
subsection 4.2, we present results of the estimation of triple differences, which exploit the tick size
reform.
4.1 Baseline Model Results
In our difference-in-differences estimations, we add several controls to account for trader-specific
effects and event-type-specific effects that go beyond time and security fixed effects. First, we use
a stock-event period dummy to control for whether a specific stock belongs to the treatment group
or to the control group during a particular event. Note that this is not collinear with stock fixed
effects, because a stock can, for different event periods, be part of the treatment or of the control
group. Second, we use an event-type dummy to capture the differences between the effect of entries
and of exits. Third, we control for HFT fixed effects to account for heterogeneity among traders.
Additionally, we consider past turnover and past bid-ask spreads as controls. All continuous
variables are in logs, unless they are simple ratios. Note that standard errors are clustered by
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stocks as this is the level at which our variable of interest varies.17
Tables 2, 3, 4 present results for illiquidity, volatility, and trading behavior, respectively.
In Table 2, our left-hand-side variables are illiquidity measures (bid-ask spread in column 1 and
2, order execution shortfall measures in columns 3 and 4, Amihud (2002) measure of illiquidity in
column 5, and price impact measure in column 6), and a market efficiency measure (autocorrelation
in column 7). We find a significant increase in all illiquidity measures under competition. For the
bid-ask spread, competition increases the spread by about 5% or 1 basis point. The estimated
coefficients on competition are very similar with or without control variables (column 1 versus
column 2). For the order execution shortfall, competition increases the shortfall based on trades
by about 2 percentage points and of the shortfall based on volume by about 4 percentage points,
or from about 32% to 36% of all non-high-frequency trading volume. Also for the Amihud (2002)
illiquidity measure, we find substantial competition effects: Stocks facing competition among
HFTs are 18% more illiquid. For the price impact measure, competition increases price impact
by 23%. Lastly, for market efficiency measured as autocorrelation, we do not find statistically
significant evidence that competition among HFTs improves market efficiency. Among control
variables, only the lagged bid-ask spread and lagged turnover are (mostly) statistically significant,
with the expected signs.
In Table 3, our left-hand-side variables are volatility measures. We find that intraday volatilities
increase significantly, while interday volatilities are unchanged, under competition among HFTs.
This is intuitive as HFTs usually close their positions at the end of each trading day and should
therefore, if at all, influence intraday measures. Specifically, 5-minute volatility increases by about
9% under competition (columns 1 and 2, with the latter column adding HFT fixed effect and
additional controls such as lagged bid-ask spread and lagged turnover). The maximum squared
price range - min-max volatility - during a trading day increases by 14% (column 3). By contrast,
interday volatilities, whether measured as close-close volatility (column 4) or as open-close volatility
(column 5), show a decline but the coefficients are not statistically significant. As for control
variables, turnover and bid-ask spreads are positively associated with volatilities.
17Clustering standard errors on relatively few - here 30 - clusters could potentially distort results more than it
improves accuracy. We therefore ran several robustness checks with simple robust standard errors, bootstrapped
and blocked bootstrapped standard errors and found that our analysis does not suffer from these distortions.
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In Table 4, our left-hand-side variables are measures of speculative trading. We find that HFTs
do more speculative - and less market-making - trading under competition. This confirms theoretical
predictions that the channel through which high-frequency trading competition adversely affects
market liquidity and volatility is through an increase in speculative trading. Specifically, the price
pressure measure based on volume increases by about 12 percentage points under competition
(columns 1 and 2, with latter column adding HFT fixed effect and other additional controls).
This amounts to an increase in the average ratio of speculative volume in total from 29% to 41%.
Similarly, the price pressure measure based on trades increases by 17 percentage points (column
3). Directional trading measures also increase significantly (columns 4 to 6). Compared to the
pre-event averages of these measures, they all more than double when HFTs compete.
Figure 5 summarizes the dynamic impacts of entry (left-hand-side panels) and exit (right-hand-side
panels). The estimated regression has the same set-up as the baseline specification but adds
dummies for each of the three days before and after the event. The dotted lines represent the
95% confidence interval. The rows show estimates for the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure (top
panel), for the 5-minute volatility measure (middle panel), and for the price pressure measure
based on trades (bottom panel). There are three takeaways: First, there is no pre-trend in any of
the measures before the event. Second, the event itself has a significant impact, with all measures
higher after entry (change from no competition to competition) and before exit (the opposite
change). Third, this impact is not temporary but lasts for several days.
4.2 Results of Tick Size Reform
This subsection presents the results of our regression setup of triple differences, which aim at
disentangling the effects of the rising share of high-frequency trading in the market from the effects
of high-frequency trading competition. As outlined in the methodology section, the effects of
competition are captured by the triple interactions term (the effect of the reform on Group 3).
The effects of the rising share of high-frequency trading in the market - induced by the tick size
reduction - are captured by the interaction term between a post-reform dummy and an indicator
of whether a security is predicted to face lower relative tick sizes after the reform (belonging to
Group 2 and Group 3).
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Table 5 presents the results. With regard to the effects of competition, we find that market
quality declines under competition, and the estimates are comparable in both magnitude and
statistical significance to those from our baseline regressions. With regard to the effects of tick
size reduction and more high-frequency trading, we find that market quality measures are either
unaffected or even improve. By highlighting that competition effects may go in the direction
opposite to the effects of more high-frequency trading, our findings complement the existing
literature that shows that more high-frequency trading may improve market conditions (see, e.g.,
Menkveld (2013) in the context of one HFT trading in the market). In more detail, Table 5, the
top panel shows the results for the illiquidity measures. Concerning the competition effects, we find
that order execution shortfall increases by about 5 percentage points (volume) and 8 percentage
points (trades), Amihud’s measure of illiquidity increases by about 15%, price impact rises by
about 21%, while there is no significant decline in autocorrelation. Concerning the effects of more
high-frequency trading, illiquidity measures are mostly unaffected, with the exception of the order
execution shortfall measure, which decreases by about 6 percentage points and the price impact
measure, which falls by about 17%.
Table 5, the middle panel shows the results for volatility measures. With regard to competition
effects, we find that 5-minute volatilities increase, by about 15%. The min-max intraday volatility
increases as well. As before, we do not find any significant effects of competition on the interday
volatility. With regard to the effects of lower tick sizes and more high-frequency trading, intraday
volatilities decline significantly while measures of interday volatilities are not affected.
Table 5, bottom panel shows the results for high-frequency trading measures. Concerning
the competition effects, price pressure measures based on trades and turnover both increase by
about 4 percentage points. Directional trading measures also increase significantly, more than
doubling under competition compared to the pre-reform averages. Concerning the effect of more
high-frequency trading, speculative trading measures are unaffected.
In sum, our findings indicate that more high-frequency trading may be beneficial for market
quality but competition among HFTs is harmful to market quality. These results imply that
regulators may encourage high-frequency trading but not competition among HFTs as the latter
leads to more speculative trading and less market-making.
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5 Robustness
This section presents the results of several robustness checks. First, we conduct propensity score
matching of our baseline model. Second, we compare how HFTs’ entries and exits, separately, affect
liquidity, volatility, and high-frequency trading behavior. Third, we use the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index as an alternative measure of competition. Last, we discuss a simple panel model approach.
Throughout the robustness section, we concentrate on a representative subset of the measures
employed in the main analysis for brevity.
5.1 Propensity Score Matching
In this section, we conduct propensity score matching of our baseline model. Our matching
procedure relies on a sample of propensity scores that are neither low (less than or equal to 10%)
nor high (greater than or equal to 90%). In other words, our matched samples contain more equal
stock events, while disregarding events that have a very high likelihood of being treated and events
that have a very low likelihood of being treated. In this way, we ensure that our results are not
driven by stock events with very different likelihoods of being in the treatment or control group in
the upcoming period given their current stock characteristics.
Table 6, the left-hand-side panel, shows pre-event means and simple t-tests of differences
between the treatment and control groups prior to the event for both the pre-matched and
post-matched samples. Four out of seven means are not different from each other in either the
pre- or the post-matched sample. For the remaining three cases, differences in the post-matched
sample decrease and are only significant at the 10% level, which is the desired outcome.
To calculate the propensity scores, we run - at the stock event level - a probit regression on
stock characteristics. The left-hand-side variable is a dummy variable indicating whether or not a
particular stock will face high-frequency trading competition on the next trading day. As controls,
we include our market quality and high-frequency trading measures from the pre-event days. There
are 125 events (entries) that form the treatment group, and 695 stock-day observation in the
control group.18 From this probit regression, we obtain the propensity scores that we need to
18We only show results for entries, but we obtain similar results for exits. Note that when looking at exits, the
procedure differs: pre-exit characteristics are likely to be different as the treatment group contains competing HFTs
at that point.
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retrieve our matched sample.
Table 6, the right-hand-side panel, shows the probit regression on the entire sample (left
column) and on the matched sample (right column). The number of stock observations in the
control group is reduced to 475 and that in the treatment group to 71 as a result of our matching
procedure. Price pressure, which is the only measure statistically significant pre-match, becomes
insignificant post-match. Our probit regression also captures less of the variation than prior to
matching - the R-squared in the pre-match regression is about 0.27 and in the post-match about
0.19 -, which indicates that the matching has indeed yielded a sample of more equal pre-event
characteristics.
Given the matched sample, we repeat our difference-in-differences analysis. Table 7 shows
the post-match effects of high-frequency trading competition on market liquidity, volatility and
high-frequency trading measures. The magnitudes of the competition coefficient are close to that
of the full sample. Specifically, illiquidity increases by 8% when measured by bid-ask spreads
(column 1), or by 32% when measured by the price impact factor (columns 2), or by about 3
percentage points when measured by the order execution shortfall (column 3). Intraday volatility
increases by about 14% (columns 4), while interday volatility shows no significant increase (column
5). Speculative high-frequency trading goes up by about 15% (column 6) and directional trading
increases (column 7). Overall, the propensity score matched regression results are similar to our
baseline regression results.
5.2 Entries and Exits Considered Separately
In our main analysis, we used both entries and exits simultaneously, with the relevant event dummy
set to 1 if there are two or more HFTs active in a stock (competition) and to zero if there is
only one HFT active in a stock (no competition). In this section, we consider entries and exits
separately, and re-estimate our baseline model.
The entry dummy is set to 1 if HFT entry leads to a change from no high-frequency trading
competition to high-frequency trading competition. The exit dummy is set to 1 if one or more
of the competing HFTs stop trading in the stock so that there is only one HFT still active in a
stock. This makes entries and exits intuitively comparable. Table 8 presents the results for market
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quality measures and high-frequency trading measures, for entries (Panel A) and exits (Panel B).
Tests suggest that there is a symmetric effect of entries and exists in all specifications: illiquidity,
intraday volatility and speculative high-frequency trading increase by about the same magnitude
when there is a change from no competition to competition as they decrease when there is the
opposite change.
5.3 An Alternative Measure of Competition
In our main analysis, we used a discrete measure of competition. In this section, we consider a
continuous measure of competition to show that the effects of competition we uncover are robust
to the way competition is measured.
To this end, we introduce the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, calculated as the sum of squares of
market shares of all HFTs trading a particular stock on a particular day. The index lies between 0
and 1. When the index is equal to 1, there is no competition; when the index is close to 0, there is
perfect competition. An attractive feature of the index is that it gives more weight to traders with
larger market shares and can additionally capture the impact of market power on market quality
and speculative trading.
We find the effect of competition to be similar to that in our main analysis. Table 9 presents the
results. Lower values of the index (more competition, less market power) lead to higher illiquidity
(columns 1 to 3), higher intraday volatilities (columns 4), and more speculative trading (columns
5).
5.4 A Panel Regression Approach
In this section, we use a simple panel regression framework as an alternative to our difference-in-differences
regression setup and show that our results remain robust.
The model is summarized in the following equation:
yj,d = α+ β1D
comp
j,d + β2D
no HFT
j,d +Xj,dΓ + pd +mj + uj,d, (4)
with j indexing the security and d being the time (day). Dcompj,d is a dummy variable that is equal
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to 1 if stock j faces competing HFTs at day d and Dno HFTj,d is a dummy variable that is equal to 1
if not a single HFT is trading in stock j at day d, and 0 otherwise. pd are daily time-fixed effects
and mj are security-fixed effects. Xe,j,d is the vector of covariates and ue,j,d is the error term. The
dependent variable is yj,d and takes the form of the same market quality measures as in the test
settings above. Note that the base is the same as in our main analysis, stock-day observation with
a single active HFT. That is, β1 captures the effect of high-frequency trading competition over
and above no competition, while β2 captures the effect of no high-frequency trading in the stock,
over and above a single active HFT. This setup allows us to compare the estimates on competition
with the estimates obtained in the baseline specifications.
We find the results to be similar to those from our baseline specification as well as to those from
our set-up of triple differences, both in magnitude and in statistical significance. Table 10 presents
estimates for market quality measures.19 We again find that high-frequency trading competition
leads to an increase in illiquidity (columns 1 to 3), an increase in intraday volatility (columns 4),
while having no significant effect on interday volatility (column 5).
6 Conclusion
Recent theoretical models predict that competition among HFTs harms market liquidity. We
test these theoretical predictions empirically, analyzing how competition affects HFTs’ trading
behavior and market quality. Our analysis exploits a unique dataset which allows us to compare
environments with and without high-frequency competition, and contains an exogenous event -
a tick size reform - which we use to disentangle the effects of the rising share of high-frequency
trading in the market from the effects of high-frequency competition per se.
Our difference-in-differences analysis shows that when HFTs compete, their speculative trading
increases by about 11 percentage points. As a result of more speculative high-frequency trading,
market quality deteriorates, as predicted by the theoretical literature. For example, bid-ask spreads
increase by 5%, intraday Amihud (2002)’s measures of illiquidity increase by 18%, and trade price
impact (Kyle’s lambda) increases by 23%. Our analysis of triple differences, which exploits a tick
19Note that in the panel regression setup, the high-frequency trading measures are always zero for observations
without any active HFTs. We therefore omit high-frequency trading measures in this setup.
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size reform, further documents that when an increase in high-frequency trading is accompanied by
high-frequency trading competition, HFTs use more speculative trading strategies and, as a result,
liquidity deteriorates and short-term volatility rises.
Our findings highlight that the channel through which high-frequency trading competition
adversely affects market quality is through an increase in speculative trading. Markets should
therefore be designed in a way that promotes high-frequency trading, but eliminates competition
among HFT speculators.
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Figure 1: Summary Statistics around Events
The figures graph simple means of Amihud’s illiquidity measure (top panel), 5-minute volatility (middle panel) and
high-frequency trading behavior (price pressure measure based on trades, bottom panel) three days before and three days
after a change from no competition to competition among HFTs.
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Figure 2: Tick Size Table around the Reform
This figure summarizes the impact of the Federation of European Securities Exchanges (FESE) tick size reform on
October 26th, 2009 on the tick sizes in the market, for affected and unaffected stocks. The vertical axis depicts actual tick
sizes in place for all relevant price levels.
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Figure 3: Illustration of the Tick Size Reform
The figure shows relative tick size (tick size to pre-event stock price ratio) for stocks before and after the Federation
of European Securities Exchanges (FESE) tick size reform on October 26th, 2009. Stocks are divided into three groups:
(i) stocks whose tick size was not affected by the reform (hollow diamonds, Group 1), (ii) stocks whose relative tick sizes
are above the pre-reform minimum (hollow circles, Group 2), (iii) stocks whose relative tick sizes are below the pre-reform
minimum (filled circles, Group 3). The grey-shaded area in the figure indicates the relative tick size levels that were not
available in the market prior to the reform. The horizontal axis represents time, before and after the reform, and the vertical
axis gives the relative tick sizes in basis points.
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Figure 4: High-Frequency Trading Activity around the Reform
This figure documents how the Federation of European Securities Exchanges (FESE) tick size reform on October
26th, 2009 affected high-frequency trading activity as a % of all trades across three groups of stocks: (i) stocks whose tick size
was not affected by the reform (dashed-dotted line, Group 1), (ii) stocks whose relative tick sizes are above the pre-reform
minimum (solid line, Group 2), (iii) stocks whose relative tick sizes are below the pre-reform minimum (dashed line, Group
3).
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Figure 5: Dynamic Impact of Entry and Exit
This figure shows point estimates for three days before and three days after the event from the difference-in-differences
estimation of entry (left-hand-side panels) and exit (right-hand-side panels). The plotted coefficients come from the following
regression: yj,d = α+ β1dist
−3
j,d + β2dist
−2
j,d + · · ·+ β3dist2j,d +Xj,dΓ + pd +mj + uj,d, which allows for multiple time periods
and multiple treatment groups, with j indexing the security and d the time (day). dist−3j,d, for example, is an indicator
of security j that belongs to the treatment group at time d three days before entry (exit). pd are daily time fixed effects
and mj are security fixed effects. Xj,d is the vector of covariates and uj,d is the error term. The dependent variables is yj,d.
The rows show estimates for the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure (top panels), for the 5-minute volatility measure (middle
panels), and for the price pressure measure based on trades (bottom panels). The dotted lines represent the 95% confidence
interval.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
This table provides summary statistics for all illiquidity (Panel A), volatility (Panel B) and high-frequency trading measures (Panel C) used in the analysis. Illiquidity measures
are: bid-ask spreads, order execution shortfalls (based on trades and volume), Amihud’s measure of illiquidity, price impact as measured by Kyle’s lambda, and autocorrelation
(measure of price efficiency). Volatility measures contain: intraday volatilities (5-minute and min-max) and interday volatilities (close-close and open-close). High-frequency
trading measures are: price pressure measures (based on trades and volume) and three directional trading measures. In the left panel, statistics on the baseline model are
reported for the days prior to an HFT entry, for both the control groups and the treatment group. In the left panel, summary statistics on Group 1 (unaffected by the reform),
Groups 2 and 3 (affected by the reform but differing in high-frequency trading competition) affected and unaffected by the Federation of European Securities Exchanges (FESE)
tick size reform on October 26th, 2009, are shown for the day prior to the reform.
units mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
PANEL A:  ILLIQUIDITY MEASURES
bid-ask spread 0.120 0.068 0.160 0.067 0.125 0.012 0.193 0.059 0.207 0.054
exec shortfall (trades) ratio [0,1] 0.498 0.150 0.421 0.193 0.525 0.047 0.340 0.207 0.296 0.201
exec shortfall (volume) ratio [0,1] 0.318 0.084 0.301 0.105 0.351 0.130 0.268 0.085 0.247 0.083
illiquidity (Amihud) million SEK 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.009 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.009 0.004 0.006
price impact (Kyle's ʎ) million SEK 11.744 21.153 10.724 22.349 6.373 3.049 14.768 37.264 7.963 7.889
price efficiency (autocorr) -0.045 0.136 -0.066 0.134 -0.053 0.130 -0.082 0.129 -0.104 0.135
PANEL B:  VOLATILITY MEASURES
intraday vola (5-min) perc squared 0.030 0.025 0.033 0.025 0.029 0.015 0.039 0.023 0.031 0.023
intraday vola (min-max) perc squared 7.856 9.934 10.108 72.257 8.042 8.421 18.344 142.838 7.923 11.977
interday vola (close-close) perc squared 3.889 6.462 3.383 7.004 3.394 4.823 3.779 5.879 2.441 4.984
interday vola (open-close) perc squared 3.088 51.420 1.145 30.086 2.802 5.253 2.799 3.815 1.764 2.523
PANEL C:  HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING MEASURES
price pressure (volume) ratio [0,1] 0.287 0.277 0.242 0.250 0.170 0.213 0.082 0.186 0.180 0.282
price pressure (trades) ratio [0,1] 0.276 0.230 0.252 0.254 0.207 0.248 0.086 0.192 0.161 0.240
directional trading 1 ratio 0.423 1.026 0.959 1.182 0.945 0.801 1.140 1.268 0.308 0.818
directional trading 2 ratio 0.445 1.361 1.212 1.736 1.016 1.069 1.513 1.873 0.472 1.557
directional trading 3 ratio 2.762 6.987 5.835 7.644 6.164 5.887 7.028 8.685 2.358 7.163
baseline tick size reform
treatment control Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
35
Table 2: Competition among High-Frequency Traders: Effects on Illiquidity
This table displays the estimates of the baseline difference-in-differences test setting summarized in the following
equation: ye,j,d = α + β1D
comp
e,j,d + Xe,j,dΓ + pd + mj + ue,j,d with e indexing entry or exit, j being the security and d the
time (day). Dcompe,j,d is the event dummy set to 1 if there is high-frequency trading competition in security j at time d, and to
zero if there is no high-frequency trading competition. pd are daily time-fixed effects and mj are security-fixed effects. Xe,j,d
is the vector of covariates and ue,j,d is the error term. The dependent variable ye,j,d takes the form of illiquidity measures
(bid-ask spread in columns 1 and 2, order execution shortfall measures in columns 3 and 4, Amihud (2002) measure of
illiquidity in column 5, and price impact measure in column 6), and a market efficiency measure (autocorrelation in column
7). Additional controls to account for trader-specific effects and event-type-specific effects that go beyond time and security
fixed effects are: (i) a stock-event period dummy to control for whether a specific stock belongs to the treatment group or to
the control group during a particular event, (ii) an event-type dummy to capture the differences between the effect of entries
and of exits, (iii) HFT fixed effects, (iv) past turnover, and (v) past bid-ask spreads. Standard errors are clustered at the
stock level and reported in parentheses.
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HFT competition (event * treatment) 0.056** 0.051*** 0.016** 0.042** 0.182** 0.233*** -0.134
(0.027) (0.013) (0.008) (0.018) (0.088) (0.061) (0.161)
event period dummy 0.002 -0.007 -0.014 -0.002 -0.025 0.052 -0.003
(0.033) (0.012) (0.006) (0.019) (0.077) (0.066) (0.123)
entry vs exit dummy -0.036 -0.017 -0.002 -0.011 0.001 -0.010 -0.161
(0.021) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010) (0.050) (0.053) (0.101)
lagged log turnover -0.052*** 0.028*** -0.033*** -0.447*** -0.173*** -0.043
(0.009) (0.005) (0.011) (0.064) (0.032) (0.051)
lagged log bid-ask spread 0.771*** -0.082*** -0.306*** 0.238 -0.063 0.062
(0.040) (0.010) (0.033) (0.156) (0.050) (0.136)
Observations 2,175 2,175 2,175 2,175 2,175 2,175 2,175
R-squared 0.8429 0.9473 0.3236 0.7794 0.6162 0.8488 0.0749
- - - - - - - -
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Stock FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
HFT FE NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
- - - - - - - -
Cluster Stock YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3: Competition among High-Frequency Traders: Effects on Volatility
This table displays the estimates of the baseline difference-in-differences test setting summarized in the following
equation: ye,j,d = α + β1D
comp
e,j,d + Xe,j,dΓ + pd + mj + ue,j,d with e indexing entry or exit, j being the security and d the
time (day). Dcompe,j,d is the event dummy set to 1 if there is high-frequency trading competition in security j at time d, and to
zero if there is no high-frequency trading competition. pd are daily time-fixed effects and mj are security-fixed effects. Xe,j,d
is the vector of covariates and ue,j,d is the error term. The dependent variable ye,j,d takes the form of interday volatility
measures (5-minute volatility in columns 1 and 2, and min-max volatility in column 3) and intraday volatility measures
(close-close volatility in column 4 and open-close volatility in column 5). Additional controls to account for trader-specific
effects and event-type-specific effects that go beyond time and security fixed effects are: (i) a stock-event period dummy to
control for whether a specific stock belongs to the treatment group or to the control group during a particular event, (ii)
an event-type dummy to capture the differences between the effect of entries and of exits, (iii) HFT fixed effects, (iv) past
turnover, and (v) past bid-ask spreads. Standard errors are clustered at the stock level and reported in parentheses.
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HFT competition (event * treatment) 0.092** 0.096** 0.141** -0.060 -0.145
(0.044) (0.043) (0.053) (0.125) (0.209)
event period dummy 0.039 0.037 0.091 0.379* 0.173
(0.036) (0.036) (0.073) (0.211) (0.188)
entry vs exit dummy -0.020 -0.007 -0.018 -0.021 -0.147
(0.034) (0.034) (0.076) (0.124) (0.150)
lagged log turnover 0.200*** 0.340*** 0.166 0.390***
(0.026) (0.043) (0.116) (0.121)
lagged log bid-ask spread 0.335*** 0.336*** 0.199 0.802***
(0.041) (0.094) (0.192) (0.214)
Observations 2,175 2,175 2,175 2,175 2,175
R-squared 0.7247 0.7423 0.5331 0.2723 0.2526
- - - - - -
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES
Stock FE YES YES YES YES YES
HFT FE NO YES YES YES YES
- - - - - -
Cluster Stock YES YES YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Competition among High-Frequency Traders: Effects of Speculative Trading
This table displays the estimates of the baseline difference-in-differences test setting summarized in the following
equation: ye,j,d = α + β1D
comp
e,j,d + Xe,j,dΓ + pd + mj + ue,j,d with e indexing entry or exit, j being the security and d the
time (day). Dcompe,j,d is the event dummy set to 1 if there is high-frequency trading competition in security j at time d, and to
zero if there is no high-frequency trading competition. pd are daily time-fixed effects and mj are security-fixed effects. Xe,j,d
is the vector of covariates and ue,j,d is the error term. The dependent variable ye,j,d takes the form of speculative trading
measures (price pressure measure based on volume (column 1 and column 2) and trades (column 3)), and directional trading
measures (column 4 to column 6). Additional controls to account for trader-specific effects and event-type-specific effects
that go beyond time and security fixed effects are: (i) a stock-event period dummy to control for whether a specific stock
belongs to the treatment group or to the control group during a particular event, (ii) an event-type dummy to capture the
differences between the effect of entries and of exits, (iii) HFT fixed effects, (iv) past turnover, and (v) past bid-ask spreads.
Standard errors are clustered at the stock level and reported in parentheses.
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HFT competition (event * treatment) 0.118*** 0.117*** 0.173** 0.392*** 0.403** 2.321**
(0.020) (0.021) (0.063) (0.139) (0.179) (0.857)
event period dummy 0.010 0.010 0.068** -0.018 0.063 0.288
(0.013) (0.013) (0.030) (0.098) (0.141) (0.605)
entry vs exit dummy 0.009 0.008 0.009 -0.013 -0.159 -0.574
(0.009) (0.009) (0.022) (0.096) (0.156) (0.683)
lagged log turnover -0.000 -0.004 -0.207*** -0.296*** -1.359***
(0.008) (0.016) (0.061) (0.100) (0.363)
lagged log bid-ask spread -0.020 -0.011 -0.575*** -0.570** -3.482***
(0.030) (0.072) (0.140) (0.208) (1.001)
Observations 2,175 2,175 2,175 2,175 2,175 2,175
R-squared 0.5755 0.5765 0.5445 0.5379 0.4198 0.3982
- - - - - - -
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Stock FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
HFT FE NO YES YES YES YES YES
- - - - - - -
Cluster Stock YES YES YES YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Competition among HFTs and the Tick Size Reform
This table presents the results of the regression set-up of triple differences around the Federation of Federation of European
Securities Exchanges (FESE) tick size on reform on October 26th, 2009. This set-up tests the effects of high-frequency
trading competition while separating the effects of increased high-frequency trading activity. The model is summarized in
the following equation: yj,d = α + β1(Postd ∗ Reformj ∗ Group 3j) + β2(Postd ∗ Reformj) + pd + mj + Xj,dΓ + uj,d,
with j indexing the security and d being the time (day). Postd indicates the period after the reform and Reformj indicates
whether security j is affected by the tick size reform, i.e. whether it belongs to Group 2 or Group 3. Group 3j is also a
dummy variable that is 1 for securities belonging to Group 3 and 0 otherwise. pd are daily time-fixed effects and mj are
security-fixed effects. Xj,d is the vector of covariates and uj,d is the error term. In Panel A, the dependent variable yj,d takes
the form of illiquidity measures (bid-ask spread in column 1, order execution shortfall measure in columns 2, Amihud (2002)
measure of illiquidity in column 3, and price impact measure in column 4), and a market efficiency measure (autocorrelation
in column 5). In Panel B, the dependent variable yj,d takes the form of intraday volatility measures (5-minute volatility
in column 2, and min-max volatility in column 3) and interday volatility measures (close-close volatility in column 4 and
open-close volatility in column 5). In Panel C, the dependent variable yj,d takes the form of speculative trading measures
(price pressure measure based on volume in column 1 and trades in column 2), and directional trading measures in column 3
to column 5. Standard errors are clustered at the stock level and reported in parentheses.
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HFT competition (post * reform * Group 3) 0.080*** 0.051*** 0.148* 0.208** -0.100
(0.013) (0.015) (0.077) (0.100) (0.197)
tick size reform (post * reform) -0.059*** 0.022 -0.150 -0.170** -0.072
(0.014) (0.023) (0.095) (0.082) (0.227)
lagged log turnover -0.019*** -0.001 -0.870*** -0.293*** 0.149
(0.006) (0.009) (0.057) (0.028) (0.108)
R-squared 0.8751 0.3355 0.6509 0.6378 0.0838
PANEL B:  VOLATILITY MEASURES
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HFT competition (post * reform * Group 3) 0.146** 0.359*** 0.122 0.015
(0.060) (0.126) (0.252) (0.230)
tick size reform (post * reform) -0.224*** -0.340*** -0.037 -0.664
(0.062) (0.129) (0.399) (0.416)
lagged log turnover -0.008 0.071** -0.062 0.310*
(0.019) (0.034) (0.188) (0.161)
R-squared 0.5867 0.5036 0.2880 0.2595
- continued on next page
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Table 5 - continued from previous page
PANEL C:  HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING MEASURES
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HFT competition (post * reform * Group 3) 0.042*** 0.041* 0.250** 0.420** 1.968**
(0.014) (0.024) (0.117) (0.194) (0.928)
tick size reform (post * reform) 0.022 0.043 -0.059 -0.232 -1.698
(0.019) (0.037) (0.155) (0.231) (1.138)
lagged log turnover 0.019*** 0.029*** -0.684*** -1.105*** -5.190***
(0.004) (0.009) (0.072) (0.122) (0.535)
R-squared 0.5091 0.4882 0.5841 0.4758 0.4460
- - - - - -
Observations 950 950 950 950 950
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES
Stock FE YES YES YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Robustness: Propensity Score Matching Diagnostics
This table provides statistics for pre-matched and post-matched propensity score samples. The left-hand-side panel shows pre-event means and t-tests of differences
between the treatment and control groups prior to high-frequency trading competition for both the pre-matched and post-matched samples. The right-hand-side panel depicts
the probit regression employed to calculate the propensity scores at the stock-event level. The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether or not a particular
stock will face high-frequency trading competition the day after. As controls, market quality and high-frequency trading measures from the pre-event days are included. The
propensity score matched sample is that with propensity scores between 0.1 and 0.9.
treatment control t-test treatment control t-test pre-match post-match
bid-ask spread mean 0.126 0.142 0.016** 0.122 0.139 0.017* log bid-ask spread 0.645 -1.185
sd 0.075 0.062 0.056 0.063 (0.930) (1.486)
exec shortfall (volume) mean 0.322 0.312 -0.01 0.329 0.313 -0.016 exec shortfall (volume) -0.350 -2.902
sd 0.085 0.104 0.086 0.106 (1.436) (2.329)
price impact (Kyle's ʎ) mean 10.486 11.362 0.876 12.048 12.167 0.118 log price impact (Kyle's ʎ) 0.058 0.274
sd 16.993 23.37 20.939 25.147 (0.251) (0.320)
intraday vola (5-min) mean 0.029 0.030 0.001 0.029 0.029 0.000 log intraday vola (5-min) 0.013 0.300
sd 0.025 0.024 0.028 0.024 (0.493) (0.462)
interday vola (close-close) mean 3.931 3.546 -0.385 4.319 3.808 -0.512 log close-close vola 0.063 0.013
sd 6.191 7.309 7.139 8.239 (0.094) (0.113)
price pressure (volume) mean 0.293 0.251 -0.042** 0.303 0.275 -0.029* price pressure (volume) 1.525* 1.281
sd 0.205 0.216 0.243 0.253 (0.779) (1.237)
directional trading 1 mean 0.337 0.843 0.506*** 0.537 0.773 0.236* directional trading 1 -0.400 -0.415
sd 1.096 1.082 1.142 0.992 (0.260) (0.330)
constant 0.335 6.516
(6.257) (7.386)
# entries 125 71
Observations 695 475
pre-match post-match probit regression
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: Robustness: Propensity Score Matching Estimations
Given the matched sample from Table 6, this table repeats the baseline difference-in-differences analysis. The model
set-up is: ye,j,d = α+β1D
comp
e,j,d +Xe,j,dΓ + pd +mj +ue,j,d, with e indexing entry, j being the security and d the time (day).
Dcompe,j,d is the event dummy set to 1 if there is high-frequency trading competition in security j at time d, and to zero if
there is no high-frequency trading competition. pd are daily time-fixed effects and mj are security-fixed effects. Xe,j,d is the
vector of covariates and ue,j,d is the error term. The dependent variable ye,j,d takes the form of market illiquidity (bid-ask
spreads in column 1, price impact factor in column 2, and order execution shortfall measure in column 3), volatility (intraday
volatility in column 4, and interday volatility in column 5) and speculative high-frequency trading measures (price pressure
measure in column 6, and directional trading measure in column 7). Additional controls to account for trader-specific
effects and event-type-specific effects that go beyond time and security fixed effects are: (i) a stock-event period dummy to
control for whether a specific stock belongs to the treatment group or to the control group during a particular event, (ii)
an event-type dummy to capture the differences between the effect of entries and of exits, (iii) HFT fixed effects, (iv) past
turnover, and (v) past bid-ask spreads. The propensity score matched sample is that of propensity scores between 0.1 and
0.9. Standard errors are clustered at the stock level and reported in parentheses.
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HFT competition (event * treatment) 0.079*** 0.325** 0.028* 0.140** 0.010 0.156** 0.319**
(0.021) (0.137) (0.016) (0.059) (0.224) (0.071) (0.145)
event period dummy -0.018 0.099 -0.025* 0.008 0.402 0.045 -0.107
(0.012) (0.061) (0.012) (0.043) (0.238) (0.028) (0.086)
entry vs exit dummy -0.023 -0.082 0.008 0.018 -0.047 0.002 0.083
(0.014) (0.057) (0.009) (0.045) (0.171) (0.032) (0.087)
lagged log turnover 0.030*** -0.161*** -0.000 0.248*** 0.172 0.002 -0.206***
(0.010) (0.044) (0.007) (0.030) (0.169) (0.015) (0.056)
lagged log bid-ask spread 0.805*** 0.002 -0.099*** 0.349*** -0.083 -0.045 -0.552***
(0.030) (0.076) (0.013) (0.052) (0.224) (0.069) (0.099)
Observations 1,346 1,346 1,346 1,346 1,346 1,346 1,346
R-squared 0.9428 0.8607 0.3193 0.7542 0.3038 0.5690 0.5502
- - - - - - - -
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Stock FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
HFT FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
- - - - - - - -
Cluster Stock YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Robustness: Competition Effects of HFT Entry and Exit separately
This table provides results for HFT entries (Panel A) and exits (Panel B), and displays estimated coefficients of the
following regression: ye,j,d = α + β1D
comp
e,j,d +Xe,j,dΓ + pd + mj + ue,j,d, with e indexing entry or exit, j being the security
and d the time (day). Dcompe,j,d is the event dummy set to 1 if there is high-frequency trading competition in security j at time
d, and to zero if there is no high-frequency trading competition. pd are daily time-fixed effects and mj are security-fixed
effects. Xe,j,d is the vector of covariates and ue,j,d is the error term. The dependent variable ye,j,d takes the form of market
illiquidity (bid-ask spreads in column 1, price impact factor in column 2, and order execution shortfall measure in column
3), volatility (intraday volatility in column 4, and interday volatility in column 5) and speculative high-frequency trading
measures (price pressure measure in column 6, and directional trading measure in column 7). Additional controls to account
for trader-specific effects and event-type-specific effects that go beyond time and security fixed effects are: (i) a stock-event
period dummy to control for whether a specific stock belongs to the treatment group or to the control group during a
particular event, (ii) an event-type dummy to capture the differences between the effect of entries and of exits, (iii) HFT
fixed effects, (iv) past turnover, and (v) past bid-ask spreads. Standard errors are clustered at the stock level and reported
in parentheses.
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HFT competition (event * treatment) 0.055*** 0.249** 0.044** 0.097** -0.122 0.187*** 0.411***
(0.017) (0.115) (0.016) (0.046) (0.147) (0.058) (0.136)
event period dummy -0.012 -0.001 -0.009 0.001 0.321 0.055* -0.035
(0.011) (0.047) (0.020) (0.034) (0.207) (0.031) (0.088)
entry vs exit dummy 0.025 0.121* 0.017 0.077 0.154 -0.019 0.069
(0.021) (0.068) (0.020) (0.048) (0.216) (0.033) (0.106)
lagged log turnover 0.026*** -0.172*** -0.044*** 0.204*** 0.165 -0.011 -0.221***
(0.009) (0.043) (0.011) (0.025) (0.128) (0.016) (0.064)
lagged log bid-ask spread 0.821*** -0.087 -0.311*** 0.312*** 0.046 -0.014 -0.585***
(0.030) (0.068) (0.036) (0.042) (0.188) (0.070) (0.144)
R-squared 0.9452 0.8490 0.7858 0.7395 0.2853 0.5372 0.5295
Observations 1,942 1,942 1,942 1,942 1,942 1,942 1,942
PANEL B:  EXIT
HFT competition (event * treatment) -0.056*** -0.230* -0.039** -0.094* 0.133 -0.152** -0.283*
(0.016) (0.125) (0.019) (0.049) (0.157) (0.062) (0.149)
event period dummy 0.014 0.228 0.024 0.094* 0.124 0.225*** 0.312*
(0.016) (0.147) (0.030) (0.054) (0.160) (0.075) (0.176)
entry vs exit dummy 0.006 0.216*** 0.032 0.094* 0.494** -0.045 0.141
(0.021) (0.074) (0.023) (0.056) (0.235) (0.054) (0.140)
lagged log turnover 0.024** -0.180*** -0.038*** 0.195*** 0.236* 0.006 -0.184**
(0.010) (0.043) (0.011) (0.027) (0.124) (0.018) (0.074)
lagged log bid-ask spread 0.787*** -0.060 -0.281*** 0.284*** 0.201 0.002 -0.466***
(0.033) (0.059) (0.033) (0.045) (0.205) (0.080) (0.135)
R-squared 0.9421 0.8502 0.7618 0.7425 0.2651 0.5273 0.5637
Observations 1,730 1,730 1,730 1,730 1,730 1,730 1,730
- - - - - - - -
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Stock FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
HFT FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
- - - - - - - -
Cluster Stock YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9: Robustness: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
This table displays results for an alternative measure of competition, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and shows
estimated coefficients of the following regression: ye,j,d = α + β1HHIj,d + Xe,j,dΓ + pd + mj + ue,j,d, with e indexing
entry or exit, j being the security and d the time (day). HHIj,d is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of competition among
high-frequency traders for entry and security j at time d. pd are daily time-fixed effects and mj are security-fixed effects.
Xe,j,d is the vector of covariates and ue,j,d is the error term. The dependent variable ye,j,d takes the form of market
illiquidity (bid-ask spreads in column 1, price impact factor in column 2, and order execution shortfall measure in column
3), volatility (intraday volatility in column 4, and interday volatility in column 5) and speculative high-frequency trading
measures (price pressure measure in column 6, and directional trading measure in column 7). Additional controls to account
for trader-specific effects and event-type-specific effects that go beyond time and security fixed effects are: (i) a stock-event
period dummy to control for whether a specific stock belongs to the treatment group or to the control group during a
particular event, (ii) an event-type dummy to capture the differences between the effect of entries and of exits, (iii) HFT
fixed effects, (iv) past turnover, and (v) past bid-ask spreads. Standard errors are clustered at the stock level and reported
in parentheses.
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Herfindahl -0.088** -0.485*** -0.059** -0.242** 0.427 -0.285*** -0.930***
(0.038) (0.150) (0.028) (0.106) (0.489) (0.029) (0.270)
event period dummy -0.007 0.022 -0.004 0.012 0.350** 0.005 -0.022
(0.011) (0.049) (0.008) (0.033) (0.164) (0.008) (0.070)
lagged log turnover 0.026*** -0.174*** -0.044*** 0.203*** 0.163 -0.004 -0.222***
(0.008) (0.032) (0.006) (0.025) (0.123) (0.005) (0.053)
lagged log bid-ask spread 0.820*** -0.090 -0.311*** 0.311*** 0.051 -0.025*** -0.592***
(0.019) (0.056) (0.012) (0.042) (0.211) (0.010) (0.088)
Observations 1,942 1,942 1,942 1,942 1,942 1,942 1,942
R-squared 0.9449 0.8485 0.7847 0.7393 0.2853 0.5701 0.5295
- - - - - - - -
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Stock FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
HFT FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
- - - - - - - -
Cluster Stock YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 10: Robustness: Panel Regression
The model is summarized in the following equation: yj,d = α + β1D
comp
j,d + β2D
no HFT
,j,d + Xj,dΓ + pd + mj + uj,d,
with j indexing the security and d being the time (day). Dcompj,d is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if stock j faces
competing HFTs at day d and Dno HFT,j,d is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if not a single HFT is trading in stock j at
day d, and 0 otherwise. pd are daily time-fixed effects and mj are security-fixed effects. Xe,j,d is the vector of covariates
and ue,j,d is the error term. The base remains the same as in the baseline analysis, stock-day observation with a single
active HFT. The dependent variable ye,j,d takes the form of market illiquidity (bid-ask spreads in column 1, price impact
factor in column 2, and order execution shortfall measure in column 3), and volatility (intraday volatility in column 4, and
interday volatility in column 5). Additional controls to account for trader-specific effects and event-type-specific effects that
go beyond time and security fixed effects are: (i) a stock-event period dummy to control for whether a specific stock belongs
to the treatment group or to the control group during a particular event, (ii) an event-type dummy to capture the differences
between the effect of entries and of exits, (iii) HFT fixed effects, (iv) past turnover, and (v) past bid-ask spreads. Standard
errors are clustered at the stock level and reported in parentheses.
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dummy for two or more HFTs 0.031** 0.139** 0.021** 0.097** -0.066
(0.015) (0.063) (0.011) (0.042) (0.215)
dummy for no HFT -0.011 -0.047 -0.022 -0.268* -0.459
(0.023) (0.101) (0.016) (0.155) (0.553)
lagged log turnover 0.003 0.049 -0.011** 0.025 -0.347***
(0.008) (0.036) (0.005) (0.028) (0.124)
lagged log bid-ask spread 0.231*** -0.013 -0.026 -0.002 0.208
(0.081) (0.099) (0.023) (0.099) (0.419)
Observations 3,840 3,840 3,840 3,840 3,840
R-squared 0.9772 0.8854 0.5279 0.8076 0.4355
- - - - - -
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES
Stock FE YES YES YES YES YES
HFT FE YES YES YES YES YES
- - - - - -
Cluster Stock YES YES YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Online Appendix
Competition among High-Frequency Traders, and Market Quality
1
A Institutional and Market Background
This section provides institutional details about the Stockholm Stock Exchange for the sample period from June 2009 to
December 2010.
A.A Market Share
Over the sample period, essentially all continuous trading - which is the one relevant for the analysis of high-frequency
trading activity - was taking place on the NASDAQ OMXS. This is one of the key advantages of our dataset for the analysis
of competition as it means we have a comprehensive record of high-frequency trading in a particular security.
Historically, the Stockholm Stock Exchange held all trading in Sweden. By 2009, alternative trading venues BATS Chi-X
Europe, Burgundy and Turquoise held a small share of over-the-counter trading. Today, their shares are significantly higher
and trading is no longer concentrated on one exchange only.
A.B Trading Hours
The limit order book market is open Monday to Friday from 9am to 5:30pm, CET, except on public holidays. Also, trading
closes at 1pm if the following day is a public holiday. Both opening and closing prices are set by call auctions. The priority
rank of an order during the trading day is price, time and visibility.
A.C Account Types
To access the market, financial intermediaries have four different possibilities: (i) Broker accounts are mostly used by
institutional investors or non-automated trader. (ii) An order routing account allows customers of the exchange member
intermediary to route their orders directly to the market. This is mostly used by direct banks such as internet banks. (iii) A
programmed account is used to execute orders through an algorithm such as a big sequential sell or buy order. (iv) Finally,
there is the algorithmic trading account, which is the quickest and the cheapest in terms of transaction costs and thus a
natural choice for HFTs.
A.D Brokers
There are about one hundred financial firms (members) registered at the NASDAQ OMXS.
A.E Hidden Orders
An important detail about the NASDAQ OMXS is that members cannot place small hidden orders. The rule for being able
to hide orders depends on the average daily turnover of a specific stock, but such orders must be at least 50,000EUR. This
figure, however, increases with turnover and reaches, for example, a minimum order size of 250,000EUR for a one million
EUR turnover. As a result, HFTs have no incentive to hide their orders.
B Additional Tables and Figures
Figure A-1 of the Online Appendix provides further details of the tick size changes. Prior to the tick size reform, stocks on
the Stockholm Stock Exchange were exposed to two different tick size tables, Tick Size Table 1 (53% of the stocks) and Tick
Size Table 2 (47% of the stocks). The two different tick size tables were a historical relict and do not reflect any differences
2
in stocks’ liquidity or volatility today. (Historically, stocks traded on the tick size table 1 where younger corporations, while
stocks traded on the tick size table 2 were blue chip stocks.)
The graph on the left-hand-side shows the relevant old and new tick size tables for the Tick Size Table 1 stocks, while the
graph on the right-hand-side shows the table for the Tick Size Table 2 stocks. Nearly all stocks were substantially affected by
the reform, except those stocks that traded on the Tick Size Table 2 and that had stock prices from SEK 100 SEK to SEK
149.99 (level 3 in the right-hand-side graph of Figure A-1). Note that Figure 2 in the main text combines the two graphs,
and depicts the stocks unaffected by the reform using the red dashed line.
3
Figure A-1: Tick Size Tables
This figure depicts tick sizes around the FESE tick size reform on October 26th, 2009 for all relevant price levels
and their corresponding Tick Size Tables on the OMXS30. The graph on the left-hand-side shows the relevant old and new
tick size tables for the Tick Size Table 1 stocks, while the graph on the right-hand-side shows the table for the Tick Size
Table 2 stocks. The vertical axis depicts the tick sizes for all relevant price levels.
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Figure A-2: Bid-Ask Spreads
This figure depicts the relative bid-ask spreads around the FESE tick size reform on October 26th, 2009 for all
relevant price levels and their corresponding Tick Size Tables on the OMXS30. The graph on the left-hand-side shows the
relative bid-ask spreads for the Tick Size Table 1 stocks, while the graph on the right-hand-side shows the relative bid-ask
spreads for the Tick Size Table 2 stocks. The vertical axis depicts the relative bid-ask spreads for all relevant price levels.
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Table A-1: Summary Statistics of Sample Stocks
This table presents summary statistics for the NASDAQ OMXS30 during the sample period June 2009 through
January 2010. It lists the ISIN code, the company’s name, number of daily trades, daily volume (in 1000 units), daily
turnover (in 1000 SEK) and the relative time-weighted bid-ask spread.
ISIN Code Secuity Name
CH0012221716 ABB Ltd
FI0009000681 Nokia Corporation
GB0009895292 AstraZeneca PLC
SE0000101032 Atlas Copco AB A
SE0000103814 Electrolux, AB B
SE0000106270 Hennes & Mauritz AB, H & M B
SE0000107419 Investor AB B
SE0000108227 SKF, AB B
SE0000108656 Ericsson, Telefonab. L M B
SE0000112724 Svenska Cellulosa AB SCA B
SE0000113250 Skanska AB B
SE0000115446 Volvo, AB B
SE0000122467 Atlas Copco AB B
SE0000148884 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken A
SE0000163594 Securitas AB B
SE0000171100 SSAB AB A
SE0000193120 Svenska Handelsbanken A
SE0000202624 Getinge AB B
SE0000242455 Swedbank AB A
SE0000255648 ASSA ABLOY AB B
SE0000308280 SCANIA AB B
SE0000310336 Swedish Match AB
SE0000314312 Tele2 AB ser. B
SE0000412371 Modern Times Group MTG AB B
SE0000427361 Nordea Bank AB
SE0000667891 Sandvik AB
SE0000667925 TeliaSonera AB
SE0000695876 Alfa Laval AB
SE0000825820 Lundin Petroleum AB
SE0000869646 Boliden AB
Mean
Trades
Mean SD
2316 1077
1545 570
2455 863
3331 947
3142 1311
4236 1677
1805 516
2798 1016
5986 2019
2266 818
2109 811
4171 943
1250 460
4651 1679
1659 782
2746 917
2255 963
1535 518
5454 2076
2270 897
1351 636
1446 499
2216 854
1485 537
3577 1389
3406 955
2688 1390
2215 674
1790 515
4241 1485
2749 1648
Volume (1000)
Mean SD
2829 1338
1205 502
1321 452
5224 1605
2701 1372
2060 774
1924 702
3082 1432
17108 8753
2154 862
1965 914
6984 2183
1163 510
11070 4734
1940 1063
2820 1049
1786 641
887 473
11386 5355
2070 1009
906 387
1012 386
2001 1111
355 154
9194 3447
5497 1768
9271 5183
2225 962
1436 481
5188 2019
3922 4722
Turnover (1000SEK)
Mean SD
388568 176143
110902 47003
418987 143539
488603 150242
439715 223536
831174 313182
247540 90601
350031 168788
1197412 617496
208511 84315
213179 99676
472870 149712
97269 43480
513746 211720
131865 73863
306488 109205
338677 117238
113873 58061
765288 376062
249035 120835
82726 35999
148239 55642
198433 107238
110940 47783
672128 260518
431676 138283
440023 259887
193898 79892
86773 28329
423193 167698
357223 324766
Bid-Ask Spread
Mean SD
0.173 0.050
0.112 0.013
0.132 0.058
0.140 0.054
0.139 0.051
0.093 0.044
0.177 0.053
0.124 0.036
0.109 0.034
0.118 0.037
0.139 0.045
0.103 0.049
0.186 0.064
0.169 0.094
0.156 0.050
0.198 0.069
0.189 0.101
0.169 0.060
0.226 0.140
0.130 0.043
0.239 0.096
0.143 0.050
0.131 0.016
0.182 0.049
0.145 0.036
0.133 0.054
0.167 0.075
0.114 0.035
0.174 0.038
0.156 0.071
0.153 0.070
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Table A-2: Correlation Matrix
This table provides correlations between all illiquidity, volatility and high-frequency trading measures we use in the analysis. Illiquidity measures are: bid-ask
spreads, order execution shortfalls (based on trades and volume), Amihud’s measure of illiquidity, price impact as measured by Kyle’s lambda, and autocorrelation (measure
of price efficiency). Volatility measures contain: intraday volatilities (5-minutes and min-max) and interday volatilities (close-close and open-close). High-frequency trading
measures are: price pressure measures (based on trades and volume) and three directional trading measures.
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bid-ask spread 1
exec shortfall (trades) -0.70 * 1
exec shortfall (volume) -0.43 * 0.46 * 1
illiquidity (Amihud) 0.17 * -0.09 * -0.03 1
price impact (Kyle's ʎ) 0.07 * -0.14 * -0.08 * 0.17 * 1
price efficiency (autocorr) -0.14 * 0.14 * 0.11 * 0.00 0.05 1
intraday vola (5-min) 0.32 * -0.14 * 0.08 * 0.02 0.03 0.05 1
intraday vola (min-max) 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.12 * 1
interday vola (close-close) -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.18 * 0.06 * 1
interday vola (open-close) -0.02 0.03 0.05 -0.01 0.11 * 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.00 1
price pressure (volume) -0.30 * 0.35 * 0.20 * -0.06 -0.04 0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 0.02 1
price pressure (trades) -0.33 * 0.38 * 0.23 * -0.08 * -0.04 0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 0.05 0.87 * 1
directional trading 1 -0.03 0.13 * 0.03 0.19 * 0.25 * -0.04 0.12 * -0.01 -0.05 0.02 -0.05 0.04 1
directional trading 2 -0.03 0.05 -0.04 0.19 * 0.26 * -0.06 * 0.05 -0.01 -0.06 * 0.02 -0.07 * -0.02 0.82 * 1
directional trading 3 -0.06 * 0.07 * -0.04 0.19 * 0.25 * -0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.07 * 0.02 -0.05 0.00 0.81 * 0.87 *
* p<0.05
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